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CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF U.S. V. WHITING: THE
POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATORY
IMMIGRATION REFORM IN AN ERA OF RESURGENT
FEDERALISM
KEELAN DIANA*
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2010, the Arizona legislature enacted Senate Bill
1070, otherwise known as the Support Our Law Enforcement and
Safe Neighborhoods Act,2 to a chorus of national protest.3 S.B. 1070
created new regulations that, in essence, outlawed the presence of
undocumented immigrants within Arizona's borders by criminalizing
the failure to carry immigration documents.4  The bill's most
controversial provision lent law enforcement officers broad discretion
to monitor the immigration status of Arizona residents when officers
possess a "'reasonable suspicion' that someone may be 'unlawfully
present.' Despite the fact that critics of S.B. 1070 viewed it as
gratuitous, it has inspired many other states, including Alabama,
Copyright 0 2012 by Keelan Diana
*Juris Doctor Candidate 2013, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), available at
www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sbl070s.pdf
2. Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., State Immigration-Related Statutes and Federal
Preemption: The Coming Supreme Court Decision, 87 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2033, 2033
(2010).
3. See e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 23, 2010).
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html?scp=1&sq=Arizona%20SB%2
01070&st-cse.
4. See id
5. Fragomen, supra note 2, at 2033. Critics charged that the "reasonable suspicion"
requirement could only lead to racial profiling and institutionally-sanctioned discrimination
against persons of Hispanic origin. See, e.g., Alessandra Soler Meetze, Q & A- Arizona's
SB1070 Racial Profiling Bill, ACLU (May 18, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-
racial-justice/q-arizonas-sbl 070-racial-profiling-bill. However, "[t]he law specifically states
that police, 'may not solely consider race, color or national origin' when implementing SB
1070." Steven A. Camarota, Center for Immigration Studies on the New Arizona Immigration
Law, SB1070, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (April 29, 2010),
http://www.cis.org/Announcement/AZ-Immigration-SB 1070.
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Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina and Utah -some of which have
immigrant populations significantly lower than Arizona 7-to pass
similar legislation. Since the passage of S.B. 1070, the tenor of the
national debate on immigration and its effects has grown more intense
and the view espoused by proponents of enhanced subfederal
immigration restrictions that states are "policy innovators that
represent the future of immigration enforcement" 9 seems to have
become more widely accepted.
Yet, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution,11 the trend toward subfederal involvement in
immigration regulation may pose a problem.12 Decades of precedent
view immigration law and regulation as areas traditionally reserved to
the federal government.13  Supremacy Clause jurisprudence thus
dictates that the immigration framework embodied in the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA)1 4 preempts certain subfederal legislation
under the doctrines of express and implied preemption.15 Federal
preemption over certain areas of law, most notably immigration, has a
long and storied history.16 Recently, however, state and local
governments have expressed an increased interest in regulating
6. State Omnibus Immigration Legislation and Legal Challenges, NAT'L. CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/immig/omnibus-immigration-legislation.aspx.
7. As of 2009, Alabama's foreign born population was 3.1% of its total population.
Alabama: Social & Demographic Characteristics, MIGRATION POLICY INST.,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/state.cfm?ID=AL.
Compare this with Arizona's 14%. Arizona: Social & Demographic Characteristics,
MIGRATION POLICY INST., http://www.migrationinformation.org/ datahub/state.cfm?ID=AZ.
8. In the context of this comment, the term "subfederal" refers to laws enacted by state
and local governments as opposed to those enacted by the federal government. See generally
Kati L. Griffith, Discovering "Immployment" Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal
Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 389, 389 (2011) (discussing
subfederal employer sanctions laws and the implications and limitations Federal laws impose
on subfederal laws).
9. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1676 (2011).
10. See generally Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local
Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1557 (2007-2008) (arguing that immigration law
has fallen naturally into the purview of state power via its increasing entanglement with
criminal law).
11. The Supremacy Clause asserts that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . anything in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. Id
13. See infra Part II.
14. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part II.
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immigration, based on a pervasive belief that the federal government
has failed to control the population of undocumented immigrants and a
widespread fear that states are "turning into . .. Third World
cesspool[s] of illegal immigrants."l 7
When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to the
petitioners in Chamber of Commerce of U. S. v. Whiting on the issue
of whether or not the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), a statute
that doles out harsh penalties to employers who fail to validate their
employees' work authorization status using E-Verify,20 was expressly
or impliedly preempted by the "'comprehensive' federal scheme
created by' the [Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986
(IRCA)]," some pundits predicted that "the Court's conservative-
leaning majority" would affirm the Ninth Circuit's prior decision in
Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano22 and uphold LAWA. 23
These predictions turned out to be correct, but Whiting hardly
represents a definitive statement on the nature of immigration
federalism.24 The Roberts Court decided Whiting on the ground that
the penalty LAWA imposes on businesses who violate its provisions
falls within the licensing exception allowed for by IRCA in its savings
17. Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! "Illegal" Immigrants Beware: Local
Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 1, 13 (2007) (quoting Joseph Turner, an aide to a California state legislator who, in
2006, drafted anti-immigrant legislation that the California Superior Court eventually struck
down). "The federal government's failure to achieve comprehensive immigration reform and
enforce existing laws . . . has motivated local governments to implement their own
immigration laws." Id. at 14.
18. 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1968 (2011).
19. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211-14 (2008).
20. A free, internet-based system designed to enable employers to check the work
authorization status of their employees. See Fragoman, supra note 2, at 2036. "Employers who
violate the prohibition against knowing or intentional employment of an unauthorized foreign
national are subject to a range of graduated penalties-from temporary suspension of a state
license up to revocation of such license." Id.
21. Fragoman, supra note 2, at 2039. See also IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (Nov. 6, 1986).
22. 558 F.3d 856, 856 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding LAWA on the ground that, among
other things, it was not preempted by IRCA).
23. See Fragoman, supra note 2, at 2039-40. "[T]he case will implicate and
potentially place in conflict-two principal preoccupations of the Court's conservative-
leaning majority: questions of federalism and states' rights on the one hand and promotion of
the interests of corporations and other businesses in a uniform and predictable worksite
compliance regime on the other hand." Id. at 2040.
24. Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1627, 1627 (1997) (explaining that "states are emerging as major players in immigration law.
. . eschewing a century of judicially protected exclusive federal authority .... No longer will
the alien's status be fixed only in Washington; no longer will the alien necessarily find herself
identically situated from one state to the next.").
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clause.25 Whiting, in so many words, is "an opinion so narrow it
squeaked when it upheld [LAWA]." To understand the potential
implications of Whiting, one must place it within the milieu of the
resurgent immigration federalism that the last few years represent, and
also within the broader context of post-S.B. 1070 legislation, some of
which is even more extreme than its ideological forebear. 27
Although the Court dismissed the petitioners' challenge to
LAWA on the narrow ground that the penalty it imposed for violating
the Act falls broadly within the category of "licensing," Whiting
actually erodes the protections offered under federal immigration
law.28 In an era of extreme anti-immigrant sentiment, Whiting
signifies not only that the Supreme Court will allow states to perform
functions that have traditionally fallen within the purview of the
federal government, but more importantly that the Court may be
willing to tolerate states like Arizona and Alabama enacting even more
harmful legislation.
Part 1I of this Comment addresses the sources of and limits to
federal dominance over immigration law and regulation, otherwise
known as the plenary power doctrine. This section examines
nineteenth-century justifications for the plenary power doctrine as
well as the presumptive foundation of this doctrine within the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Part 11(a)
describes the federal preemption framework, while Part 11(b) considers
the historical sources of the plenary power doctrine by examining
some of the early foundational cases.
Part III of this Comment discusses some of the contemporary
decisions that subtly eroded the plenary power doctrine and thus paved
the way for the Court's decision in Whiting. Part IV examines
Chamber of Commerce of U. S. v. Whiting in greater detail, describing
the reasoning behind Chief Justice John G. Roberts's majority opinion
25. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011). IRCA also
restricts the ability of States to combat employment of unauthorized workers. The Act
expressly preempts "any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for
employment, unauthorized aliens." § 1324a(h)(2). Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1975.
26. John Gibeaut, Alien Resurrection: Justices Open the Door for States to Control
Immigration Status, A.B.A. J., (Aug. 19, 2011),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/alienresurrectionjustices-open-the-door-for-states
to-controlimmigration/.
27. This Comment will be focusing specifically on Arizona's SB 1070 and Alabama's
H.B. 56. See infra Part V(a) and (b).
28. See infra Part II, V(c).
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and Justices Stephen Breyer's and Sonia Sotomayor's dissenting
opinions.
Part V of this Comment analyzes Whiting's impact on current
state-level legislation. Part V(a) looks to Whiting's possible impact on
Arizona's S.B. 1070, and part V(b) looks to its impact on Alabama's
H.B. 56. Finally, Part V(c) considers whether other types of challenges
to anti-immigrant laws-most notably challenges based on procedural
due process-may ultimately prove more useful to opponents of state-
level anti-immigrant legislation than challenges based on the
preemption doctrine.
II. THE SOURCES OF AND LIMITS TO THE FEDERAL PLENARY POWER
OVER IMMIGRATION
There are no specific provisions in the United States
Constitution that explicitly authorize the federal government to
regulate immigration, 9 and yet "[o]ver no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete." 30 This source-less yet
pervasive authority over immigration comprises the plenary power
doctrine. Stephen Legomsky explains the extent of the plenary power
doctrine by stating:
When regulating immigration, Congress may
discriminate on the basis of race. It may discriminate on
the bases of gender and legitimacy. It may restrict
aliens' political speech without having to establish a
clear and present danger. With some qualifications,
Congress may disregard procedural due process when
excluding aliens . . . federal immigration statutes ihave]
been singled out for special judicial restraint ....
In combination with the Supremacy Clause, which
hypothetically "invalidates state laws that 'interfere with or are
contrary to federal law,"' 32 the plenary power doctrine seemed, for a
29. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN
BRITAIN AND AMERICA, IN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 116 (Stephen H.
Legornsky & Cristina M. Rodriguez eds., 2009).
30. Id. at 113 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)).
31. Id.
32. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F.Supp.2d 477, 518 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (quoting N. J.
Payphone Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of W. N.Y., 299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002)).
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time, to be unassailable.33 This section examines the general
framework of federal preemption, the nineteenth-century roots of the
plenary power doctrine, and some of the foundational cases that
expanded upon the federal government's dominance in the field of
immigration law and policy.
A. Federal Preemption Framework: The Last, Best Hope for
Federal Control Over Immigration?
The Supremacy Clause is the Constitutional basis for the
doctrine of federal preemption.34 This doctrine renders invalid any
state or local law that runs counter to federal law. 35 Parties seeking to
invalidate a state or local law using the preemption doctrine may
choose to challenge it based on two general modes of preemption:
express and implied.36 A state or local law will be stricken down under
express preemption when Congress has clearly authorized federal laws
or regulations that explicitly preclude any subfederal legislation, thus
making its intention apparent. 3 7 To determine whether the legislation
manifests such an intention to preclude subfederal legislation, one
must examine "the plain language of a federal statute." 38 In the context
of immigration law, "a state statute is [generally] expressly preempted
if it clearly attempts to regulate immigration" in a manner inconsistent
with federal law.
Implied preemption breaks down into two subcategories: field
preemption and conflict preemption.40 The doctrine of field
preemption stipulates that "when Congress has legislated in a subject
area to such an extent that it demonstrates a 'clear and manifest
purpose' to keep states from enacting laws in that area," or when "a
federal regulatory scheme is 'so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,"'
33. See, e.g, Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211
(1824)).
34. McKanders, supra note 17, at 20-21.
35. Id. at 20-21.
36. See Fragoman, supra note 2, at 2034.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. McKanders, supra note 17, at 21. States tend to rely on their Tenth Amendment
police powers as a means of legitimating subfederal immigration legislation. Id. at 22. The
Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
40. McKanders, supra note 17, at 2 1.
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state legislation may be preempted.41 In other words, if Congress'
intends to completely regulate the field with which the challenged
legislation deals, there is "a 'complete ouster of state power' and the
state law will be pre-empted.42 The doctrine of conflict preemption
breaks down into three independent articulations: (1) conflict
preemption exists when it would be impossible to comply with both
the challenged state or local law and a federal statute; (2) conflict
preemption exists when "the state law frustrates the purposes of the
federal law;" and, (3) conflict preemption exists when "the state or
local law is 'an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 4 3 Due in part to the
pressure exerted by the combined doctrines of express and implied
preemption, "state power in the area [of immigration regulation has
been] reduced to a virtual nullity, [while] federal power [has been]
unfettered."4
B. Historical Sources of the Federal Plenary Power
The Nineteenth Century saw a historic increase in the number
of immigrants wishing to enter the United States.45 Despite the fact
that the Constitution does not contain any explicitly enumerated
powers regarding the development of an integrated federal scheme to
regulate immigration, the United States Supreme Court decided that
the federal government should have nearly absolute power over
immigration-or, plenary power.46 Because the plenary power
doctrine stands for the principle that "when Congress exercises [its]
powers [over immigration], its decisions are final," it is closely tied to
the doctrine of federal preemption. 47 In Chae Chan Ping v. United
States,48 otherwise known as "the Chinese Exclusion Case," the
Supreme Court articulated the principle that would become known as
41. Fragoman, supra note 2, at 2034 (footnote omitted).
42. McKanders, supra note 17, at 21.
43. Fragoman, supra note 2, at 2034 (footnotes omitted).
44. Spiro, supra note 24, at 1629.
45. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 127-30
(Stephen H. Legomsky & Cristina M. Rodriguez eds., 5th ed. 2009) (discussing anti-
immigrant sentiment in the late nineteenth century). See also Ryan Terrance Chin, Comment,
Moving Toward Subfederal Involvement in Federal Immigration Law, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1859, 1886-89 (2011) (discussing the post-Civil War historical context of the development of
a federal regulatory framework for immigration).
46. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
47. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 29, at 113.
48. 130 U.S. 581, 581 (1889).
202 [VOL.12:1
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the plenary power doctrine. 49 The plenary power doctrine can be
thought of as a type of "immigration exceptionalism,"so in which
federal control over immigration law and policy substantially limits,
but does not eliminate, judicial review despite the clear directive of
Marbury v. Madison.5 1
Chae Chan Ping represents the earliest, and one of the
strongest, articulations of the plenary power doctrine. In this case, a
Chinese laborer who had been living legally in the United States was
excluded upon returning from a trip abroad even though he had
obtained a certificate evidencing his right to return.52 The Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1888, which "prohibit[ed] Chinese laborers from
entering the United States who had departed before its passage, having
a certificate . . . granting them the right to return," barred him from
reentry.53 The Court, in upholding this exclusion, reasoned that "[t]he
government, possessing the powers which are to be exercised for
protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the
occasion on which [these] powers shall be called forth," even if the
exercise of these powers may involve "exclud[ing] foreigners from the
country whenever, in pCongress's] judgment, the public interests
require such exclusion." According to the Court in Chae Chan Ping,
the United States government, as the representative body of a
sovereign nation, possessed "sovereign powers delegated by the
49. See id. at 609 (stating that "[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident
of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign
powers delegated by the constitution [sic], the right to its exercise at any time when, in the
judgment of the government; [sic] the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted
away or restrained on behalf of any one. The powers of government are delegated in trust to
the United States, and are incapable of transfer to any other parties. They cannot be abandoned
or surrendered. Nor can their exercise be hampered, when needed for the public good, by any
considerations of private interest. The exercise of these public trusts is not the subject of barter
or contract. Passage of immigration laws and the determination of rights emanating therefrom
are] held at the will of the government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure.").
50. Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End ofPlenary Power, 16 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339
(2002).
51. See 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (explaining that "the particular phraseology of the
constitution [sic] of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that
courts .. . are bound by that instrument.").
52. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582-83 (1889).
53. Id. at 589. See also Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, §§ 1, 2, 25 Stat. 504. It is
important to note that Chae Chan Ping was decided at a time when "racist and nativist anti-
Chinese sentiment became widespread in California, and gradually gained influence on the
national political scene." Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After A Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550
(1990).
54. Id. at 606.
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constitution [sic]," and thus had the ability to ignore extant laws or
adopt new ones "at its pleasure," and without legal recourse.
Four years later, the Court decided Fong Yue Ting v. United
56States, which presented a similar scenario, and the Court responded
with a similarly expansive justification for cruel and seemingly
arbitrary decisions regarding the exclusion of otherwise eligible
noncitizens. In Fong Yue Ting, Justice Horace Gray begins his
majority opinion by citing a principle he traces back to Chae Chan
Ping: "[i]t is an accepted maxim of international law that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty .. . to forbid
the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only
in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe."58 Fong Yue Ting upheld a law requiring Chinese laborers
who wished to remain in the United States to obtain the testimony of
"at least one white witness" that the laborers had been residents of the
United States at the time of the passage of the Act. 59 Although Fong
Yue Ting echoed the arbitrary justifications espoused in Chae Chan
Ping, the Court did, in fact, reason that the Chinese laborers who filed
the suit might be "permitted by the government of the United States to
remain in the country," and therefore may be "entitled ... to the
safeguards of the Constitution."6 0 However, the Court stated that the
government of the United States still retained the unlimited "power to
exclude aliens and the power to expel them," as well as the "right" to61develop a more comprehensive system of immigration registration.
Thus, Fong Yue Ting articulated both that "aliens residing in the
United States" are entitled to "protection of the laws" and that they
"remain subject to the power of Congress to expel them"--that they
are entitled to some protection in other words, but only as much as
Congress chooses to dispense.6Y
These early cases largely served to deny immigrants their
procedural and substantive due process rights, but they also articulated
the areas in which judicial intervention into the realm of immigration
policy may have been acceptable. Although the Court in Chae Chan
Ping deferred to Congress's plenary power over immigration, it still
55. Id. at 609.
56. 149 U.S. 698, 698 (1893).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 698.
59. Geary Act, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25 § 6 (1892) (repealed 1943); See also Fong Yue
Ting, 149 U.S. at 698-702.
60. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713.
61. Id. at 713, 714.
62. Id. at 713.
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heard Chae Chan Ping's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 6 3
Likewise, the Court in Fong Yue Ting acknowledged that under certain
circumstances, the rights of noncitizens should fall within the aegis of
the constitutional protection. The ideological rigidity implicit in the
dictate of United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy64  that
"[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process
as far as an alien denied entry is concerned," 65 diminished in later
years. In the context of the late Twentieth Century, Supreme Court
decisions largely respected the plenary power doctrine, with its
assertion of the near-absolute powers of a "sovereign nation," but they
also expanded the scope of judicial review and thereby began to carve
out a space in which the constitutional rights of noncitizens could gain
consideration.66
III. DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE BUILDUP TO WHITING
In the context of the plenary power doctrine, the current trend
of state-based initiatives aimed at wresting power from the federal
government may seem like somewhat of an anomaly; how did states
come to "reach[] into the murky regulatory zone that lies somewhere
between immigration law and police authority to assert control over
immi ation enforcement?"67 The answer may lie with De Canas v.
Bica, a case that, like Whiting, did not seem as if it would be an
important statement on the continuing viability of the federal
preemption framework when it was decided in 1976. Yet De Canas,
63. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582-83 (1889).
64. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
65. Id. at 544.
66. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (holding
that a permanently excluded lawful permanent resident should be granted procedural due
process rights, although he may be detained indefinitely due to the fact that he attempted to
return to the United States after a prolonged period behind the Iron Curtain); Yamataya v.
Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (holding that procedural due process rights attach in the case of
deportation proceedings, in that the noncitizen challenging her deportability status may argue
that she was given neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580 (1952) (holding that lawful permanent residents who joined the Communist
Party after their admission to the United States deserved a consideration of their procedural
due process rights, even if these rights were trumped by the congressional determination that
former Party members may be excluded); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that
Congress may not always argue against judicial review of matters relating to immigration
based on the political question doctrine when there are legitimate constitutional issues
involved); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (arguing that the plenary power doctrine is
subject to significant constitutional limitations).
67. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1688.
68. 424 U.S. 351, 351 (1976).
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like Whiting, cracked the door open even wider for further subfederal
control of immigration regulation. 69 Thus, both De Canas and Whiting
can be thought of as constituting touchstones in the developing field of
"'immployment' law," just as both of these decisions managed to find
a middle ground between the federal preemption framework and
subfederal employer-sanctions laws. 70
A. De Canas v. Bica: The Slow Demise of the Plenary Power
Doctrine
The Burger Court decided De Canas v. Bica in 1976, well
"before the federal government enacted [its own] employer-sanctions
law."71 De Canas presented the issue of "whether California could
enact a law that prohibited the employment of foreign nationals
without work authorization ... if such erployment would have an
adverse effect on lawful resident workers." Writing for the majority,
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. reasoned that even though the "[p]ower
to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal
power ... the Court has never held that every state enactment which in
any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per
se pre-empted by this constitutional power, whether latent or
exercised." In other words, "all state regulation of aliens [is not] ipso
facto regulation of immigration."7 4 Because the federal immigration
scheme in 1976 did not necessarily "draw in the employment of illegal
aliens as 'plainly within . .. [the] central aim of federal regulation,"'
the Court held that the challenged California law was not preempted
under the Supremacy Clause. According to the Court in De Canas,
Congress's failure to enact a federal statute sanctioning employers for
knowingly hiring undocumented workers left state legislatures free to
69. See Chin, supra note 45, at 1866 (stating that "[i]n holding that the California law
was not preempted by federal law, the Court relied on the idea that the federal immigration
scheme at the time did not 'draw in the employment of illegal aliens as plainly within . . . that
central aim of federal regulation."' (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 (1976)).
70. Griffith, supra note 8, at 390, 395. Griffith defines "immployment law" as "hybrids
between immigration law and employment law" such as most subfederal employer-sanctions
laws. Id. at 394.
71. Id. at 395.
72. Chin, supra note 45, at 1866; Joshua J. Hemdon, Broken Borders: De Canas v. Bica
and the Standards That Govern the Validity of State Measures Designed to Deter
Undocumented Immigration, 12 TEX. Hisp. J.L. & PoL'Y 31, 50 (2006).
73. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354-55 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 355.
75. Id. at 359.
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draft and enact their own employer-sanctions laws.76 This logic paved
the way for Whiting by suggesting that states need only look for gaps
in the seemingly-comprehensive framework laid out by the INA or the
IRCA if they wished to make incursions into immigration law and
policy.
In articulating De Canas's holding, Justice Brennan defined
immigration regulation-the entirety of what may or may not be
preempted by federal law-as "essentially a determination of who
should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions
under which a legal entrant may remain." 77 On its face, then, De
Canas seems to shore up the preemption doctrine and thus the notion
that the federal government retains plenary power over matters relating
to immigration. However, Justice Brennan's definition of immigration
regulation-which manages to be both narrow and vague at the same
time-excludes many potentially significant categories, including
employment and licensing. According to the Court in Whiting, in De
Canas, the federal government "had 'at best' expressed 'a peripheral
concern with the employment of illegal entrants."' 79 De Canas spelled
out the Supreme Court's preemption framework for more than three
decades until Chamber of Commerce of U. S. v. Whiting overruled it in
2011 on the ground that "state laws imposing civil fines for the
employment of unauthorized workers like the one we upheld in De
Canas are now expressly preempted."80
76. Id. at 358-60.
77. Id. at 355.
78. See Herndon, supra note 72, at 50-52.
79. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 (2011), aff'g 558
F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009).
80. See McKanders, supra note 17, at 5. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 at 1975.
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IV. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF U.S. V. WHITING: "FORCED
FEDERALISM,,81 OR A NARROW EXCEPTION?
In Chamber of Commerce of US. v. Whiting, the United States
Supreme Court held that federal law does not preempt a provision of
LAWA that requires employers to use E-Verify because the penalties
this law imposes upon employers who fail to comply with it "fall
squarely within" the "licensing" exception allowed for under federal
law.82 The federal law in question was the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA),83 which was enacted ten years after De Canas,
and which "makes it 'unlawful for a person or other entity ... to hire,
or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an
alien knowing the alien is . . . unauthorized."84 IRCA defines
"unauthorized alien" as someone who is "not 'lawfully admitted for
permanent residence' or not otherwise authorized ... to be employed
in the United States." Yet Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, also admits that IRCA "restricts the ability of States to
combat employment of unauthorized workers" by preempting "'any
State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than
through licensing or similar laws). . . ."'86 Like De Canas, Whiting
seems to want it both ways: it acknowledges the ostensible dominance
of the federal government within the field of immigration law and
regulation, and yet allows potentially problematic subfederal
legislation to pass based upon a narrow, technical reading of the
statutory text.
In the opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court
holds that "Arizona's licensing law falls well within the confines of
the authority Congress chose to leave to the States and therefore is not
81. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1688. Cunningham-Parmeter describes
"forced federalism" as "allocations of power between the two levels of government.... [in
which] the states are . . . immigration intermeddlers. In contrast to dual federalism, which
involves reserved powers, and cooperative federalism, which involves delegated powers,
forced federalism involves demanded powers. The states now insist on having a seat at the
table on immigration enforcement decisions, even though the federal government has not
invited them . . . the source and scope of the states' authority within forced federalism
constantly expends and contracts as courts produce differing pronouncements on the
permissibility of the states' immigration-related conduct." Id. at 1688. Forced federalism
"defines a legally amorphous zone between clearly impermissible state immigration actions . .
and clearly allowable conduct." Id. at 1724-25.
82. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973.
83. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
84. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1974 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(h)(3)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1975 (quoting § 1324a(h)(2)).
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expressly preempted." By holding that Arizona's law is neither
expressly nor impliedly preempted by IRCA, the Court voiced support
for Arizona's strategy of drafting LAWA so that its provisions
mirrored those of IRCA. The Court explained that "Arizona went the
extra mile in ensuring that its law closely tracks IRCA's provisions in
all material respects," which included adopting IRCA's definition of
"unauthorized alien" and incorporating a provision that requires
Arizona to request the Federal Government to verify "'whether an
alien is authorized to work in the United States."' 88 "As a result," the
Court asserts, "there can by definition be no conflict between state and
federal law as to worker authorization . . . ."89 Furthermore, the Court
charges that only the "egregious" act of "knowing[ly] or
intention[ally] violat[ing]" LAWA triggers the revocation of a
business's license;90 thus, employers who hire unauthorized workers
without affirmative knowledge or intent that they are doing so may not
be penalized. 9 1 The Court also contends that Congress intended "to
strike a balance" by "allocating authority between the Federal
Government and the States" when it enacted IRCA.92 Because Arizona
was simply seeking to enforce the ban that IRCA, a federal statute,
already imposed, the Court allowed LAWA to stand. 93
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer argues that
LAWA does not fall within IRCA's licensing exception, despite its
purposeful invocation of the word "licensing," and is thus preempted
by federal law.94 LAWA "strays beyond the bounds of the federal
licensing exception" by defining license more inclusively than IRCA
intended it to be defined. 95 Justice Breyer reasons that LAWA's
definition of the term "license" "include[s] articles of incorporation
and partnership certificates, indeed virtually every state-law
authorization for any firm, corporation, or partnership to do business in
the State."96 Justice Breyer points out that according to the majority's
interpretation of IRCA, the statute would "undermine" itself, and its
proclaimed dominance over subfederal legislation, by "permit[ting]
87. Id. at 1981.
88. Id. at 1981 (quoting ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(B)).
89. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981.
90. Id. at 1984.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1987 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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States to eviscerate the federal Act's preemption provision." 97
Additionally, Justice Breyer accepts the argument presented by the
Chamber of Commerce and related business interests that LAWA's
mandatory license suspension amounts to a so-called "business death
penalty" due to the fact that it "subjects lawful employers to increased
burdens and risks of erroneous prosecution," despite the majority's
statements to the contrary. 98 Justice Breyer argues that these harsh
penalties will disincentivize the hiring of any minorities within the
state of Arizona and thus will lead to increased discrimination in
hiring practices. 9 Justice Breyer concludes that combined with the
fact that E-Verify has actually proven to be an unreliable system for
determining when someone is authorized to work in the United States,
these arguments render the majority opinion in Whiting erroneous. 00
Writing in a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor argues that the majority's interpretation of IRCA's savings
clause simply "cannot be reconciled with the rest of IRCA's
comprehensive scheme." 0' Like Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor
would have held that "federal law preempts the provision of the
Arizona Act making mandatory the use of E-Verify" due to the fact
that "Arizona has effectively made a decision for Congress regarding
the use of a federal resource . . . "102 Justice Sotomayor also points out
that because Congress intended the IRCA to result in "'uniform'
enforcement of 'the immigration laws of the United States,"'
03
Congress most likely did not intend "for the 50 States and countless
localities to implement their own distinct enforcement and
adjudication procedures for deciding whether employers have
employed unauthorized aliens."104 Justice Sotomayor suggests a
reading of IRCA's savings clause that would permit States "to impose
licensing sanctions after a final federal determination that a person has
violated [IRCA]," thereby preserving the federal government's
ultimate right to impose sanctions on those violating the law. 0 5
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1990.
99. Id. at 1996-97.
100. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1997 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1998 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359)
104. Id. at 2003.
105. Id. at 1998.
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V. THE ROAD TO NOWHERE?: WHITING'S IMPACT ON CURRENT
STATE-LEVEL IMMIGRATION EFFORTS
Before the Court delivered its decision in Whiting, scholars
speculated that the issue-a relatively technical and academic one on
its face-had the capacity to "implicate-and potentially place in
conflict-two principal preoccupations of the Court's conservative-
leaning majority." 6 These preoccupations are "questions of
federalism and states' rights on the one hand and the promotion of the
interests of corporations and other businesses in a uniform and
predictable worksite compliance regime on the other hand."l 07 Given
this context, Whiting managed to create an unusual alliance of civil
rights activists and business organizations, including the Service
Employees International Union, 08 the Asian American Justice
Center, 09  the National Immigrant Justice Center,o Associated
Builders and Contractors, Inc., and the Chambers of Commerce of
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, New Jersey, and West Virfinia, as
well as related business organizations from many other states. All of
these groups were united in opposition to LAWA and its potentially
debilitating effects on both the immigrant and the business
communities.112
Many current state-level immigration laws are unabashedly
modeled after S.B. 1070,113 and coalitions as unlikely as the one that
106. See Fragomen, supra note 2, at 2040.
107. Id.
108. See Brief for Service Employees International Union et al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting the Petitioners, Chamber of Commerce of the U. S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968,
1968 (2011) (No. 09-115).
109. See Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
Petitioners, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1968 (2011) (No.
09-115).
110. See Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
the Petitioners, Chamber of Commerce of the U. S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1968 (2011)
(No. 09-115).
111. Brief for Business Organizations as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Chamber
of Commerce of the U. S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1968 (2011) (No. 09-115).
112. John Gibeaut, Alien Resurrection: Justices Open the Door for States to Control
Immigration Status, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2011, at 22, available at http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/alien resurrectionjustices open the door for states to control immigrati
on/.
113. See Seth Freed Wessler, Bills Modeled After Arizona's SB 1070 Spread Through
States, COLORLINES (March 2, 2011, 10:33 AM),
http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/03/sb 1070 copycat bills.html;Brian Lawson, U.S.
Supreme Court Look at Arizona Immigration Law Will Affect Alabama Law, AL.COM (Dec.
12, 2011, 6:30 PM)),
http://blog.al.com/breaking/2011/12/us-supremecourt-lookatarizo.html (stating that
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emerged to oppose LAWA have arisen in these states as well. 114 State
officials "greeted [Whiting] as a signal that the high court may be
willing to consider" hearing challenges to S.B. 1070.115 Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined enforcement of S.B. 1070 in
April 2011,116 and on December 12, 2011, the Supreme Court issued
an order announcing that it would hear Arizona's appeal of the Ninth
Circuit decision. Given that "the states and the courts likely will run
immigration law and policy for the foreseeable future," and that
there is such broad opposition to these laws among civil rights activists
and traditionally conservative business organizations, it is important
for advocates of comprehensive immigration reform to understand
how the new state-level laws work and how to oppose them
successfully.
A. Arizona's S.B. 1070
S.B. 1070 creates "a state trespassing violation for unlawful
presence" in addition to "[r]equir[ing] state and local law enforcement
to . .. attempt to determine the immigration status of a person involved
in a lawful stop, detention or arrest" based on "reasonable
suspicion."ll9 Similarly, the statute makes it illegal "for an
unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a
public place or perform work as an employee or independent
contractor.",
120
S.B. 1070 is widely considered to be "the granddaddy of
single-state immigration bills . . . .',121 Yet, despite its broad-ranging
"[s]ome sections of Arizona's law are nearly identical to Alabama's. Those include sections
dealing with immigration checks by law enforcement and a section criminalizing job-seeking
by day laborers.").
114. Gibeaut, supra note 112, at 22.
115. Id.
116. Adam Liptak, Justices Uphold State Law Penalizing Hirers of Illegal Aliens, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2011, at Al8.
117. lan Millhiser, Supreme Court Will Hear SB1070 Case, Justice Kagan Is Recused,
THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 12, 2011, 10:29 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/12/12/387434/supreme-court-will-hear-sbl070-case-
justice-kagan-is-recused/.
118. Gibeaut, supra note 112, at 22.
119. Ann Morse, Arizona's Immigration Enforcement Laws, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS.
(Jul. 28, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/analysis-of-arizonas-
immigration-law.aspx.
120. Id.
121. Scot Kersgaard, Pearce Allies Attempt to Manipulate Recall Election, COLO. INDEP.
(Oct. 10, 2011, 9:01 AM), http://coloradoindependent.com/102069/pearce-allies-attempt-to-
manipulate-recall-election.
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influence, the Obama administration successfully challenged S.B.
1070-in a move seen as highly unusual 22-and the law was enjoined
by the Department of Justice in July 2010.123 In a press release,
Arizona Governor Jan Brewer, who signed S.B. 1070 into law,
responded to the Obama administration's injunction by arguing that:
The truth is the Arizona law is both reasonable and
constitutional. It mirrors substantially what has been
federal law in the United States for many decades.
Arizona's law is designed to complement, not supplant,
enforcement of federal immigration laws. Despite the
Department of Justice's claims . .. Arizona is not trying
'to establish its own immigration policy' or 'directly
regulate the immigration status of aliens.'1 24
In this statement, Brewer makes plain the Arizona legislature's
strategy for circumventing preemption, which points to LAWA's
success in "mirror[ing] substantially" IRCA's savings clause. That
S.B. 1070 failed where LAWA succeeded is interesting indeed, and
has given hope to some opponents of harsh subfederal anti-immigrant
legislation.
The coming Supreme Court decision regarding S.B. 1070 may
disclose exactly how much leeway the Roberts Court is willing to cede
to states in determining the scope and extent of certain facets of their
own immigration policy. Of course, the ultimate decision may be less
surprising now that Justice Elena Kagen has recused herself.12 5
Although Justice Kagan's absence may prove to be a boon to
proponents of subfederal immigration regulation and anti-immigrant
activists alike, it may also have no effect at all; if the remaining eight
Justices split evenly down the middle, then the Ninth Circuit's
122. See Kris W. Kobach, Op-Ed., Why Arizona Drew a Line, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2010, at A3 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/opinion/29kobach.html?scp
-4&sq=Arizona%20SB%201070&st-cse (stating "Predictably, groups that favor relaxed
enforcement of immigration laws, including the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, insist the law is unconstitutional. Less
predictably, President Obama declared it "misguided" and said the Justice Department would
take a look.").
123. State Omnibus Immigration Legislation and Legal Challenges, NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?Tabld=22529.
124. Press Release, Governor Jan Brewer, Governor of the State of Arizona (July 6,
2010) (on file with author), available at http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/PR 070610
StatementGovBrewer.pdf.
125. Millhiser, supra note 117. Justice Kagen also took no part in deciding the writ of
certiorari. Id
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decision, and the Department of Justice's injunction, may remain in
place, and Whiting's impact on the underlying issue of S.B. 1070's
. - 126
constitutionality may remain uncertain.
B. Alabama's H.B. 56
Alabama's H.B. 56, otherwise known as the Beason-Hammon
Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act,127 is generally
described as the "harshest anti-immigrant state
law. . ." among the wave of post-S.B. 1070 legislation, comprising
"'a wish list of restrictionist immigration provisions at the state law
level."' 1 28 It has been almost "universally condemned by immigrant
and civil rights groups," 1 29 and holds the unique distinction of uniting
prominent religious leaders, including Roman Catholic and United
Methodist Bishops,13 0 with more traditional advocates for immigrants'
rights like the American Civil Liberties Union and the National
Immigration Law Center.131 Just as opposition to - S.B. 1070
demonstrates that this law has the potential to adversely impact
Arizona's economy, opposition to H.B. 56 reveals how the interests of
many seemingly unrelated groups could be affected by such a drastic
law. H.B. 56 "attempts to criminalize every aspect of life for
immigrants by making it illegal for undocumented immigants to
work, rent housing, go to school and get a ride in the state." 13 H.B. 56
criminalizes any unauthorized presence in the state of Alabama, and
renders undocumented immigrants' contracts void.133 Alabama's law
received harsh censure when media outlets reported that Hispanic
families had withdrawn their children from school en massel34 and that
126. Id.
127. ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1-30 (2011)
128. Julianne Hing, The Legal Case Against Alabama's Worst-in-the-Country
Immigration Law, COLORLINES (June 21, 2011, 10:45 AM),
http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/06/whatsso wrongwithalabamas-hb_56.html (citing
Kevin Johson, dean of law at the University of California, Davis).
129. Id. atil5.
130. Kent Faulk, Religious Leaders Battle Alabama Immigration Law, THE CHRISTIAN
CENTURY (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.christiancentury.org/article/2011-08/religious-leaders-
battle-alabama-immigration-law.
131. Federal Court Ruling on Alabama's Anti-Immigrant Law Undermines Fundamental
American Values, ACLU (Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/federal-
court-ruling-alabamas-anti-immigrant-law-undermines-fundamental-american.
132. Hing, supra note 128.
133. Id.
134. Audrey Singer & Jill H. Wilson, Why Immigration Uproar Went Nationwide,
CNN.CoM (Oct. 24, 2011, 7:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/24/opinion/singer-
immigration-nationwide/index.html.
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"[m]uch of [Alabama's tomato] crop [rotted on the vine] as many of
the migrant workers who normally work [the] fields. .. moved to
other states to find work after Alabama's immigration law took
effect."135
In October 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit struck down certain provisions of H.B. 56, including
the requirements that public schools track the immigration status of all
of their students and the provision "allow[ing] the state to charge
someone who fails to produce proof of legal status with a criminal
offense."l36 However, the remainder of H.B. 56 was allowed to stand,
including the "reasonable suspicion" provision borrowed directly from
S.B. 1070, which allows law enforcement officers to detain anyone
they suspect of being present in the United States without
authorization. 137 This is notable because when the Ninth Circuit
enjoined S.B. 1070 in its entirety, it did so based in part on a provision
similar to this one. Although law enforcement officers in Alabama
are currently permitted to do what those in Arizona are not to, H.B. 56
has met with resistance on such a broad scale that it has become a
lesson in the principle of unintended consequences.139
C. Due Process Challenges: A Stronger Argument than Federal
Preemption?
Unfortunately, Whiting may have opened the floodgates for
more "copycat" legislation that mimics Arizona's tried and tested
Legal Arizona Workers Act. While LAWA is certainly not as far-
reaching or reactionary as S.B. 1070, it has been granted the seal of
approval by the Roberts Court.140 Current challenges to subfederal
legislation that focus on preemption now run the risk that, like
Arizona, states will go the Whiting-sanctioned "extra mile" to ensure
135. The 10 Numbers You Need to Know About Alabama's Anti-Immigrant Law: State
Can Say Goodbye to Hundreds of Millions in Tax and Farm Revenue, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Nov. 14, 2011),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/11/top_ 10 alabama immigration.htmi.
136. Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Eleventh Circuit Ruling on Alabama's HB 56
Fuels Debate over the Limits of State Immigration Measures, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Oct.
18, 2011), http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=857.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Corey Dade, Have the Crackdowns on Immigration Gone Too Far?, NPR (Nov. 25,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/25/142674917/have-the-crackdowns-on-immigration-
gone-too-far.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 82-93.
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that they closely track federal provisions "in all material respects."'41
If opponents of anti-immigrant legislation wish to challenge H.B. 56
and similar statutes, they may need to look beyond preemption to the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 4 2
which have historically afforded procedural rights to certain
noncitizens, 143 and may also provide a foundation for economic
challenges to subfederal legislation that mirrors S.B. 1070 and H.B.
56.
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided Clark v. Martinez,144
which extended the guarantee of procedural due process to
inadmissible noncitizens by holding that they may not be detained
indefinitely beyond a period "reasonably necessary" to achieve their
removal. Alabama's law stipulates, in part, that people who are
stopped and arrested without a valid license may be brought before a
magistrate and detained until prosecution.14 6 This specific provision
resulted in significant negative publicity for the state when a German
Mercedes-Benz executive was arrested and detained for driving
141. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981 (2011).
142. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 2. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
143. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that Congress may not
always argue against judicial review of matters relating to immigration based on the political
question doctrine when there are legitimate constitutional issues involved); Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678 (2001) (arguing that the plenary power doctrine is subject to significant
constitutional limitations).
144. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
145. Id. at 385-87. Ninety days is considered to be a reasonable period, although
inadmissible noncitizens may be detained for longer periods. Id
146. ALA. CODE § 32-6-9 (2011). "Every licensee shall have his or her license in his or
her immediate possession at all times when driving a motor vehicle and shall display the same,
upon demand of a judge of any court, a peace officer or a state trooper. . . . if a law officer
arrests a person for a violation of this section and the officer is unable to determine by any
other means that the person has a valid driver's license, the officer shall transport the person to
the nearest or most accessible magistrate. . . . If the person is determined to be an alien
unlawfully present in the United States, the person shall be considered a flight risk and shall
be detained until prosecution or until handed over to federal immigration authorities." Id.
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without his passport.14 7 Given the Supreme Court's dictate in Martinez
that even undocumented noncitizens may not be detained indefinitely,
it is possible that H.B. 56 and legislation containing comparable
provisions may be vulnerable to attack on this front. Likewise, S.B.
1070, H.B. 56, and similar laws may be susceptible to challenges
based on the theory that their far-reaching economic consequences
deprive citizens and noncitizens alike of property without due process
of law. Despite the optimistic title of H.B 56-the Taxpayer and
Citizen Protection Act-"the law is certain to be a drag on economic
development even without considering costs associated with
enforcement of the law."1 4 8 Alabama's economy could potentially lose
an estimated $40 million as a result of the departure of undocumented
workers and laborers,14 9 a figure that does not factor in the loss of the
state and local tax revenue paid by families headed by undocumented
immigrants, which totaled $130,298,333 in 2010.150 The labor
shortages that resulted from H.B. 56 have also caused significant
losses in Alabama's agricultural industry. Alabama farmers have
claimed losses of $100,000 and $300,000 due to the labor shortages
that followed in H.B. 56's wake.' 5 ' It is true that H.B. 56 is less than
one year old, and thus the full measure of its economic effects may be
difficult to ascertain. If H.B. 56 does indeed prove to have a
detrimental impact on Alabama business and industry, then advocates
for immigrants' rights may have an easier time making arguments
based on due process claims, as there may be demonstrable proof that
citizens were deprived of "property, without due process of law."1 52
Whether these advocates choose to foreground the plight of
147. Will Oremus, Mercedes Exec Arrested Under Ala. Immigration Law, SLATE (NOV.
21, 2011, 7:48 PM),
http://slatest.slate.com/posts/20l 1/11/2 1/mercedes benz executive arrested under alabamai
mmigration law.html.
148. SAMUEL ADDY, THE NEW ALABAMA IMMIGRATION LAW: A PRELIMINARY
MACROECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 1(2011), available at
http://cber.cba.ua.edu/rbriefs/New%20AL%201mmigration%2OLaw%20-
%20Prel%20Macro%20Assessment-1.pdf.
149. Id. "For example, conservatively assuming that an illegal worker makes $5,000 a
year (about $20 a day for 250 days of work or some other combination), the absence of say
10,000 illegal workers would mean a $40 million contraction in the Alabama economy
allowing for repatriation of 20 percent of income to home countries." Id.
150. Unauthorized Immigrants Pay Taxes, Too, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Apr. 18,
2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/unauthorized-immigrants-pay-taxes-too.
151. The 10 Numbers You Need to Know About Alabama's Anti-Immigrant Law: State
Can Say Goodbye to Hundreds of Millions in Tax and Farm Revenue, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Nov. 14, 2011),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/11/top 10_alabama immigration.html.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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noncitizens subject to periods of potentially indefinite detention or the
dilemma faced by farmers whose customary labor force has
evaporated may rely, in large part, on the Supreme Court's decision
regarding the constitutionality of S.B. 1070.
VI. CONCLusioN
In holding that federal law neither expressly nor impliedly
preempts LAWA, Chamber of Commerce of the US. v. Whiting did
not noticeably undermine the requirement that subfederal immigration
laws and regulations must comply with the federal preemption
framework, nor did it depart radically from the precedent established
by De Canas v. Bica and earlier decisions. It did, however, serve to
reveal a failsafe method to states wishing to enact their own
immigration policy; they must simply, like Arizona, go "the extra
mile" to ensure that their laws closely track federal law "in all material
respects."l 53 While it unambiguously revealed a method for
circumventing preemption, the Court in Whiting limited itself to the
facts of the case before it by hinting its decision on "a single
concept-the idea of license . . . ." Even within the circumscribed
context of this case, however, opponents of future subfederal anti-
immigrant legislation may still have a more difficult time asserting
arguments based upon the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of
federal preemption when challenging state and local laws. This
difficulty becomes more evident considering that a legal scholar
recently claimed that the Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence
continues to be, at worst, "a disorderly jumble that . . . obscure[s] . . .
federalism's boundaries," and at best an area governed by an overly
155
narrow holding that may be difficult to apply to subsequent cases.
What is certain, however, is that while Whiting may have
"amounted to a green light for vigorous state efforts to combat the
employment of illegal workers," these efforts have not had uniform
success, and have had the unintended consequence of solidifying a
diverse coalition of opponents whose criticism grows louder-and
more public-every day.
153. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981.
154. Gibeaut, supra note 112, at 22.
155. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1691(footnote omitted).
156. Adam Liptak, Illegal Workers: Court Upholds Faulting Hirers, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2011, at Al8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/us/27scotus.html?_r-l&
hp.
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